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LANDLORD PREMISES LIABILITY: ESTABLISHING
RATIONAL BOUNDARIES
I. INTRODUCTION
A landlord's immunity from tort liability was equitable at com-
mon law if the lease was viewed as a conveyance of land.' However,
the evolving nature of the lease requires a more egalitarian principle
that shifts more of the burden of premises liability to the landlord.
The modern tenant in our urbanized and highly technical society
expects his lease to include a "well known package of goods and
services," along with the landlord's implied warranty that the dwell-
ing is, and will continue to be, habitable." Although California
courts have diminished the landlord's traditional shield against
© 1986 by Jacquetta M. Bardacos
1. Siegel, Is the Modern Lease a Contract or a Conveyance - A Historical Inquiry?,
52 U. DET. J. URn. L. 649, 652 (1975).
2. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 622, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr.
704, 709 (1974). The court stated:
Modern urbanization has not only undermined the validity of utilizing
general property concepts in analyzing landlord-tenant relations, but it has also
significantly altered the factual setting directly relevant to the more specific duty
of maintaining leased premises. . . . Contemporary urban housing and the con-
temporary tenant stand in marked contrast to this agrarian model ...
First, the increasing complexity of modern apartment buildings not only
renders them much more difficult and expensive to repair than the living
quarters of earlier days, but also makes adequate inspection of the premises by a
prospective tenant a virtual impossibility ...
Second, unlike the multiskilled lessee of old, today's city dweller has a sin-
gle, specialized skill unrelated to maintenance work. . . . In addition to these
significant changes, urbanization and population growth have wrought an enor-
mous transformation in the contemporary housing market, creating a scarcity of
adequate low cost housing in virtually every urban setting ...
These enormous factual changes in the landlord-tenant field have been par-
alleled by equally dramatic changes in the prevailing legal doctrines governing
commercial transactions. Whereas the traditional common law "no duty to
maintain or repair" rule was steeped in the caveat emptor ethic of an earlier
commercial era, modern legal decisions have recognized that the consumer in an
industrial society should be entitled to rely on the skill of the supplier to assure
that goods and services are of adequate quality. ...
It is just such reasonable expectations of consumers which the modern "im-
plied warranty" decisions endow with formal, legal protection.
Id. See also Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New
Issues, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1444 (1974).
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premises liability if a tenant has possession of the premises,3 never-
theless, problems remain.
Suppose, for example, that a landlord leases an apartment and
discloses the existence of a crack in the tread of the stairs to the
tenant, or this obvious defect arises during the lease period but the
tenant fails to notify the landlord. If the tenant is subsequently in-
jured by the defect, the landlord can be held liable. However, the
extent of such liability is unclear under the present law.4 As a result
of the tremendous upheaval in traditional landlord-tenant relations,
the courts and legislature face the difficult problem of reconstructing
an equitable doctrine which will protect tenants without completely
eradicating landlord protections against premises liability. Present
case laws suggests that because a breach of the warranty of habita-
bility may constitute a tort action, the solution lies at the point of
confluence between contract warranty theory and tort liability.' As
yet, no single legal basis for a solution has proven sufficient.
One possible solution is to hold the landlord liable in tort under
the general negligence statute for tenant or third party injuries
which occur on the premises.7 Under this approach the landlord is
3. See, e.g., Golden v. Conway, 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976) (land-
lord held liable in tort for maintaining a known dangerous condition); Green, 10 Cal. 3d 616,
517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974) (landlord held to impliedly warrant in all residen-
tial leases that the premises will be free from all defects which render a premises unfit).
4. See Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 464-67, 698 P.2d 116, 126-28, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 213, 223-25 (1985) (court explicitly limited the extension of strict liability to landlords
for latent defects which exist at the time a residential dwelling leases). The hypothetical was
extracted from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.1 illustration 5 (1977). The
Restatement generally provides the following resolution to the problem: "any duty to inspect
problems of this nature rests equally on [tenant] as on [landlord]. [Landlord] would not be
liable for injuries caused by the crack under the rule in this section." The Restatement sug-
gests that where the landlord discloses the existence of the defect to the tenant upon leasing, he
may be subject to liability under the negligence doctrine if the condition can be considered a
violation of an implied warranty of habitability or a duty created by statute or administrative
regulation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.5 comment d, § 17.6 comments
b-d (1977).
Prosser states that "[tihe jurisdictions which find a tort duty usually construe the lessor's
covenant, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, to mean merely that he must
repair only within a reasonable time after he has been notified of the dangerous condition, or
has otherwise discovered it." W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 410 (4th ed. 1971).
5. See infra notes 18-39 and accompanying text for present case law.
6. See infra notes 18-39; see also Evans v. Thomason, 72 Cal. App. 3d 978, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 525 (1977); Green, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Rowland
v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
7. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1714 (Deering 1985). The statute provides that:
Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the man-
agement of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by
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liable for all foreseeable injuries occurring on the leased premises,
even if the landlord has no control over the item causing the injury.'
Yet, most significantly, it becomes apparent that the negligence prin-
ciple places an onerous burden upon an innocent tenant if an injury
occurs on the premises as the result of a latent, unforeseeable and
undiscoverable defect.
A recent alternative approach adopted by the California Su-
preme Court in Becker v. IRM Corp.9 attempts to resolve this prob-
lem by holding the landlord strictly liable for injuries sustained due
to latent defects. This theory provides a greater measure of protec-
tion to the tenant, 0 and moves toward a more predictable and fair
system." However, theoretical and pragmatic problems exist under
the strict liability doctrine. 2 For example, if discoverable defects on
the premises arise during the lease period and the landlord is not
given notice, it is unduly harsh to place the burden of liability solely
upon the landlord.'
This comment sets out a rational doctrine which will firmly and
predictably establish the dimensions of a landlord's premises liability
want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself. The extent of liability
in such cases is derived by the title in compensatory relief.
Id.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 17.3-.5 (1977). See also Brennan v.
Cockrell Investments, Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1978); Evans, 72 Cal.
App. 3d 978, 140 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1977); Minoletti v. Sabini, 27 Cal. App. 3d 321, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 528 (1972). For a discussion of the disadvantages of a complete reliance on this system,
see infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
9. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
10. For a summary of the strict liability approach, see generally Prosser, The Attack
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). See also
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697(1963); Green, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704; Becker, 38 Cal. 3d 454,
698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
11. See Browder, The Taming of a Duty - The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MicH.
L. REV. 99 (1982); see also Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 464, 698 P.2d 116, 126,
213 Cal. Rptr. 213, 223, (1985).
12. See infra notes 41-99 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the notice requirement in strict liability, see infra notes 84-87
and accompanying text. The notice element cannot be divorced from any realm of landlord-
tenant relations. A tenant is required to give notice to the landlord of defective conditions
which exist on the premises to recover in contract (e.g. under the warranty of habitability).
Where the defect is undiscoverable and the tenant by definition did not (and was not able to)
give notice, the tenant cannot recover in contract. Strict liability is now applicable in these
situations. Alternatively, where a defect is blatantly discoverable, the question of notice should
not be disregarded, for just as the inability to give notice triggers different means of recovery in
tort, the ability to give notice should limit a tenant's means of recovery. See generally Love,
Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 19
Wis. L. REV. 150 (1975).
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in California. In establishing these boundaries, this comment will
provide tenants with a means of recovery for physical and mental
injuries in tort which result from defective premises. Section II ex-
amines the historical basis supporting the extension of the warranty
of habitability into tort liability. Section III, a call for moderation,
proposes that the landlord be held strictly liable in all circumstances
except where a patent defect arises after the premises is leased. Fi-
nally, section IV provides an alternative theory of recovery for situa-
tions in which the tenant cannot recover under strict liability theory.
II. HISTORICAL BASIS FOR THE EXTENSION OF THE
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY INTO TORT LIABILITY
A. A Landlord's Duty at Common Law
At early common law, a landlord was immune from tort liabil-
ity for injuries resulting from defects on the premises. 4 The ration-
ale underlying this rule was that a tenant received an interest in the
land and thus was in control of the land. The landlord retained only
a reversionary interest and had no right to enter the premises until
the lease expired." Consequently, courts held that the landlord was
under no duty to the tenant.' 6
The harsh results of this rule in cases involving tenants and
other persons who were injured on the premises caused the courts to
create several judicial exceptions.' Until 1968, California courts
consistently denied recovery for injuries sustained on the premises
unless one of the exceptions applied.
B. Emergence of the Implied Warranty of Habitability and its
Impact on Tort Liability: Green v. Superior Court
In Green v. Superior Court,'8 the California Supreme Court
14. See PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 399 (4th ed. 1971); TIF-
FANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 104 (3d ed. 1939).
15. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 400.
16. See, e.g., Brewster v. DeFremery, 33 Cal. 341, 347 (1867) (wall of tenant's dwelling
crumbled and crushed tenant to death).
17. These exceptions fit into the following six categories: 1) when the landlord is aware
of a concealed defect existing on the premises at the time the tenant takes possession; 2) when
the landlord covenants in the lease to repair the premises; 3) when the injury occurs in a
common area over which the landlord maintains control; 4) when the premises are to be used
for a public purpose; 5) when the landlord negligently repairs the premises; and 6) when a
statutory duty to repair exists. See PROSSER, supra note 14, at 399; POWELL, 2 POWELL ON
REAL PROPERTY 234 [21 (1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 358-62 (1973).
18. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
[Vol. 26
1986] LANDLORD PREMISES LIABILITY
adopted the Hinson v. Delis19 ruling which imposed a warranty of
habitability in all residential leases as a matter of law. The Green
court defined the scope of the warranty as follows:
Under the implied warranty which we recognize, a residential
landlord covenants that premises he leases for living quarters
will be maintained in a habitable state for the duration of the
lease. This implied warranty of habitability does not require
that a landlord ensure that leased premises are in perfect, aes-
thetically pleasing condition, but it does mean that 'bare living
requirements' must be maintained. In most cases substantial
compliance with those applicable building and housing code
standards which materially affect health and safety will suffice
to meet the landlord's obligation under the common law implied
warranty of habitability we now recognize. 20
While the courts created a remedy for tenants, the Legislature
provided a statutory framework for breaches of the implied contrac-
tual relationship between the landlord and the tenant. The "repair
and deduct remedy" provided in California Civil Code sections
1941, 21 1941.1,22 and 194223 essentially places the duty of mainte-
19. Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972). In Hinson, the
plaintiff was allowed to withhold rental payments when the landlord failed to make the repairs
she requested on her weakened, rotting bathroom floor.
20. G~ren, 10 Cal. 3d at 637, 517 P.2d at 1182, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (footnotes
omitted).
21. CAL. Ctv. CODE § 1941 (Deering 1985). This section provides:
The lessor of a building intended for the occupation of human beings must, in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition fit for such
occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which render it un-
tenantable, except such as are mentioned in section nineteen hundred and
twenty-nine.
Id.
22. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941.1 (Deering 1985). This section provides:
A dwelling shall be deemed untenantable for purposes of Section 1941 if it sub-
stantially lacks any of the following affirmative standard characteristics:
a) Effective waterproofing and weather protection of roof and exterior walls,
including unbroken windows and doors.
b) Plumbing or gas facilities which conformed to applicable law in effect at the
time of installation, maintained in good working order.
c) A water supply approved under applicable law, which is under the control of
the tenant, capable of producing hot and cold running water, or a system which
is under the control of the landlord, which produces hot and cold running water,
furnished to appropriate fixtures, and connected to a sewage disposal system
approved under applicable law.
d) Heating facilities which conformed with applicable law at the time of instal-
lation, maintained in good working order.
e) Electrical lighting, with wiring and electrical equipment which conformed
with applicable law at the time of installation, maintained in good working
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nance and repair upon lessors of residential property in the absence
of contrary agreement. The landlord must make the premises habita-
ble and repair all subsequent dilapidations "which render it unten-
antable," except those caused by the tenant's negligence. 24 To re-
cover under California Civil Code section 1942, a tenant must give
notice of dilapidations and, if the landlord does not repair them
within a reasonable time, the tenant may elect to either make the
repairs himself and deduct the cost from the rent, or may abandon
the premises and no longer be required to pay rent or perform other
obligations.2"
These statutory provisions were not intended by the Legislature
order.
f) Building, grounds and appurtenances at the time of commencement of the
lease or rental agreement in every part clean, sanitary, and free from all accu-
mulations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents and vermin, and all areas
under control of the landlord kept in every part clean, sanitary, and free from
all accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents, and vermin;
g) An adequate number of appropriate receptacles for garbage and rubbish, in
clean condition and good repair at the time of the commencement of the lease or
rental agreement, with the landlord providing appropriate serviceable recepta-
cles thereafter, and being responsible for the clean condition and good repair of
such receptacles under his control.
h) Floors, stairways, and railings maintained in good repair.
Id.
23. CAt.. CIV. CODE § 1942 (Deering 1985). This section provides:
a) If within a reasonable time after written or oral notice to the landlord or his
agent, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 1962, of dilapidations rendering
the premises untenantable which the landlord ought to repair, the landlord ne-
glects to do so, the tenant may repair the same himself where the cost of such
repairs does not require an expenditure more than one month's rent of the
premises and deduct the expenses of such repairs from the rent when due, or the
tenant may vacate the premises, in which case the tenant shall be discharged
from further payment of rent, or performance of other conditions as of the date
of vacating the premises. This remedy shall not be available to the tenant more
than twice in any twelve-month period.
b) For the purposes of this section, if a tenant acts to repair and deduct after the
30th day following notice, he is presumed to have acted after a reasonable time.
The presumption established by this subdivision is a rebuttable presumption
affecting the burden of producing evidence and shall not be construed to prevent
a tenant from repairing and deducting after a shorter notice if all the circum-
stances require shorter notice.
c) The tenant's remedy under subdivision (a) shall not be available if the condi-
tion was caused by the violation of Section 1929 or 1941.2.
d) The remedy provided by this section is in addition to any other remedy pro-
vided by this chapter, the rental agreement, or other applicable statutory or
common law.
Id.
24. Stoiber v. Honeychuck, 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 925, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194, 205 (1980).
25. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942 (Deering 1985).
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to be the exclusive remedy and do not foreclose other types of tenant
action. As stated in Green, "the statutory remedies of section 1942
have traditionally been viewed as additional to, and complementary
of, the tenant's common law rights." 6 Although the court empha-
sized that it did not wish to inhibit common law growth in this field,
it did not specifically address the issue of damages for tortious injury.
Such injury includes discomfort, annoyance, mental anguish, per-
sonal property damage or personal injury, resulting from the breach
of warranty of habitability. The court ignored the possible relation-
ship between warranty and premises liability and also failed to im-
pose tort liability upon the landlord for breach of the warranty of
habitability. However, the subsequent statutory creation of landlord
responsibilities in contract laid the foundation for recognition of such
tort remedies.
C. Emergence of the View that a Breach of the Warranty Gives
Rise to Tort Liability
A tort cause of action can be brought coincidentally with, or
wholly independent from, a suit for a breach of the implied warranty
of habitability.27 Since the suit for a breach of the implied warranty
is essentially a contractual one, this cause of action is by definition
independent from a tort cause of action. The fact that tortious acts
occur during the performance of a duty created by a contract, how-
ever, does not negate the tortious nature of a landlord's liability. The
same act may be both a tort and a breach of contract. Even where
there is a contractual relationship between the parties, a cause of
action in tort may sometimes arise from the negligent performance of
a contractual duty. As one court has stated, "a tort may grow out of
or be coincident with a contract." 28 In other contexts, the existence of
a contractual relationship does not immunize a tortfeasor from liabil-
ity for his wrongful acts in breach of the contract. 29 This logic simi-
26. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 630, 517 P.2d at 1177, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
27. Stoiber, 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194.
28. Bayuk v. Edson, 236 Cal. App. 2d 309, 320, 46 Cal. Rptr. 49, 56 (1976) (breach of
an oral contract for architectural services in connection with construction of plaintiff's home).
29. Id. at 309, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 49. For example, the principal and agent relationship is
one context in which a tortfeasor-agent cannot escape liability simply because a contract be-tween the principal and the plaintiff existed. The general rule that an agent is not liable in an
action based on contract brought by a third person where the fact of emergency and name of
the principal has been disclosed is applicable when a statute imposing liability on one assum-ing to act as an agent for his wrongful acts in the course of his agency is not involved. How-
ever, Bayuk held-that an agent who has committed a tortious act while acting under authority
of his principal becomes liable as a result of the contract.
1986]
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larly applies in the landlord-tenant context.
Moreover, a breach of the warranty of habitability can itself
support a tort cause of action."0 The proposition that the warranty of
habitability extends into tort liability is founded upon an extension
of the internal logic of three significant cases: Rowland v. Chris-
tian,81 Evans v. Thomason,"2 and Stoiber v. Honeychuck. 3
1. Expansion of Rowland into the Warranty Realm
The implied warranty of habitability could serve as the basis of
tort liability, since the courts expanded the Rowland rationale to im-
pose upon the landlord a duty to provide housing which does not
subject the tenant to an unreasonable danger of harm. In Rowland,
the supreme court stated with regard to the landlord's traditional
immunity:
Although it is true that some exceptions have been made to the
general principle that a person is liable for injuries caused by
his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances, it is
clear that in the absence of a statutory provision declaring an
exception to the fundamental principle enunciated by section
1714 of the Civil Code [or some other reason clearly supported
by public policy], no such exceptions shall be made."'
Thus, the traditional trespasser-licensee-invitee classification of
duties of an owner or possessor of land and occupier of land was
discarded.3" The court held that the historical justifications for the
30. See, e.g., Stoiber, 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1980).
31. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
32. 72 Cal. App. 3d 978, 140 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1977).
33. 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1980).
34. 69 Cal. 2d at 112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100. See also 3 WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW § 453A, at 279-80 (8th ed. 1984 Supp.).
35. See Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 116, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 108. The court
stated that:
These classifications were: a trespasser is a person who enters or remains
upon land of another without a privilege to do so; a licensee is a person like a
social guest . . . who is privileged to enter or remain upon land by virtue of the
possessor's consent, and an invitee is a business visitor who is invited or permit-
ted to enter or remain on the land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected
with business dealings between them.
Although the invitor owes the invitee a duty to exercise ordinary care to
avoid injuring him, the general rule is that a trespasser and licensee or social
guest are obligated to take the premises as they find them insofar as any alleged
defective condition thereon may exist, and that the possessor of the land owes
them only the duty of refraining from wanton or willful injury. Through this
semantic the common law has moved unevenly and with hesitation towards im-
posing on owners and occupiers a single duty of reasonable care in all
[Vol. 26
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traditional common law distinctions, and for traditional landlord im-
munity as a result of those distinctions, are not justified in our mod-
ern society." The landlord was found to be responsible (as is every-
one) "for an injury caused to another by want of ordinary care or
skill in the management of his property. '3 7 In essence, after the abo-
lition of the traditional landlord immunity from premises liability, a
cause of action in tort could be supported by a breach of the war-
ranty of habitability.
2. Evans v. Thomason: An Implicit Extension of the War-
ranty of Habitability in Tort Liability
Support for the extension of the warranty of habitability into
tort liability appears clearer in Evans v. Thomason."3 The tenants
on at least two occasions in Evans notified the landlords that the
kitchen outlet was defective, and the landlords admitted knowledge
of the existing danger. The court held the landlords did not exercise
ordinary care in the management of their property, and the landlords
therefore violated their statutory duty under the general negligence
statute.3 ' The court implicitly acknowledged that the breach of the
warranty of habitability supported the tort cause of action. The court
implied that an action could lie in tort because evidence of the breach
of the warranty of habitability supported the negligence suit; the
standard of care was implicitly the breach itself. After Evans, the
courts needed to make only one small explicit theoretical leap to per-
mit tenant recovery in tort when the warranty of habitability had
been breached.
3. Stoiber v. Honeychuck: An Explicit Leap into Tort
Liability
In Stoiber v. Honeychuck,4' the court stated that, "[Civil Code
section] 1714 may be used as a springboard for a tenant's negligence
action against his landlord for failure to maintain the premises in a
circumstances.
Id.
36. See generally Hansen v. Richey, 237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965);
Miller v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 204 Cal. App. 2d 160, 22 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1962).
37. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. For a discussion
of the negligence doctrine, see infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
38. 72 Cal. App. 3d 978, 140 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1977).
39. Id. at 985, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
40. 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1980).
19861
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habitable condition."' 1 Stoiber explicitly stands for the proposition
that tort remedies are available to tenants who suffer physical or
mental injuries as a result of a violation of Civil Code section 1941.
III. STRICT LIABILITY CAUSE OF ACTION FOR A BREACH OF
WARRANTY
In Becker v. IRM Corp.," the California Supreme Court ar-
ticulated the standard that in the personal injury context, California
does support a strict liability cause of action for landlord premises
liability in limited circumstances.' But the court refused to deter-
mine "whether strict liability would apply to a disclosed defect,"" or
"whether the landlord is strictly liable for defects in the property
which develop after the property is leased." 4 The court implicitly
indicated that salient factors which aid in an examination of strict
premises liability revolve around the type of defect involved and the
temporal occurrence of the defect. Accordingly, the following four
categories can be construed to resolve the questions which remain
open in light of Becker: (1) latent defects existing at the time the
property leases; (2) patent/disclosed defects existing at the time the
property leases; (3) latent defects arising after the property leases;
(4) patent defects arising after the property leases. Since Becker cre-
ates a stricter rule of general tort liability for the landlord, it is im-
portant that care be taken in determining its scope through a clear
delineation of these categories.
A. Latent Defects Existing at the Time the Property Leases: Becker
v. IRM Corp
The general rule of non-liability of the landlord for physical
harm due to a latent (undiscoverable) defect on the leased premises
rests on the common law foundation. First the lease is analogized to
a sale of the leased property for a term and then the doctrine of
caveat emptor is applied to that transaction.4" The current dissatis-
faction with the maintenance of this preferred status under the law
has most recently been expressed in Becker.4' The landlord was held
41. Id. at 925, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
42. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
43. Id. at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
44. Id. at 464 n.4, 698 P.2d at 122 n.4, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219 n.4.
45. Id. at 467 n.5, 698 P.2d at 124 n.5, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 221 n.5.
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17, introductory note (1976).
47. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 457, 698 P.2d at 119, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
[Vol. 26
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responsible for all undiscoverable conditions arising prior to leasing.
In Becker, the plaintiff resided in a 36-unit apartment complex
owned by the IRM Corporation. The plaintiff was seriously injured
when he slipped and fell against the untempered glass shower door
in his apartment. If the shower door had been made of tempered
glass, the risk of serious injury would have been reduced. Prior to
plaintiff's accident, only five showers in the complex had shower
doors of tempered glass. After the accident, the thirty-one shower
doors of untempered glass were replaced with tempered glass. The
court held defendant strictly liable for the defective shower door, an
"undiscoverable defective condition," which existed at the time of
leasing.48
The Becker court relied primarily upon the strict liability doc-
trine established in the landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products Inc.,49 and upon cases in the landlord-tenant realm that
found the strict liability doctrine to include landlords.5" In Green-
man, the court announced that "a manufacturer is strictly liable in
tort when an article he places in the market, knowing that it is to be
used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being."61 This holding was based on public
policy which demands that the manufacturer bear the risks of inju-
ries caused by its defective products. The court in Becker indicated
that the strict liability doctrine could be applied in the landlord-ten-
ant context if the stream of commerce marketing chain was extended
beyond the manufacturer and retailer of products to the landlord.
The court held that the strict liability doctrine does not depend upon
whether the articles under the court's scrutiny are leased or sold in
large quantities or amounts. Instead, the doctrine depends upon
whether the article, such as a dwelling which is leased, is placed on
the market. 2 Now, even a landlord who places only one apartment
on the market may be within the stream of commerce and therefore
subject to strict liability." The purpose underlying this harsh rule is
two-fold: (1) to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from a de-
fective condition are borne by the landlord who put the products (the
dwelling) on the market rather than by the injured persons and (2)
48. Id.
49. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
50. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 460, 698 P.2d at 119, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
51. 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
52. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 462-64, 698 P.2d at 120-22, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 217-19.
53. Id.
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to spread the costs of compensation throughout society."'
The policy arguments articulated in Becker and in the cases
dealing with the creation of the warranty of habitability echo the
policy arguments accepted in Greenman, and indicate that courts in
certain factual settings are predisposed to impose strict liability upon
landlords. 5 The California Supreme Court has observed that the av-
erage modern-day tenant is no different from any other consumer of
goods. 6 Through a residential lease, a tenant seeks to purchase
housing from a landlord for a specified period of time. This is consis-
tent with the Greenman reasoning that ordinary purchasers of goods
are at a complete disadvantage in the marketplace and that manufac-
turers should therefore be held strictly liable.
The Becker court considered the economic advantages available
to landlords that justify placing the cost of injuries on landlords.' 7
The landlord receives the financial benefit from the tenant's use of
appliances included in rental housing, and has the ability to spread
the cost of compensation throughout the marketing system by ob-
taining insurance or otherwise accounting for the risk of loss." The
majority concluded that landlords do not bear an onerous burden
with the acceptance of strict premises liability because they can pass
on the increased costs to their tenants. In areas where rent control
has been implemented, the landlord, through the doctrine of strict
liability, is forced to bear the burden of the risk of loss alone. 5'9 But
the landlord can better afford insurance to cover the risk of loss than
the tenant.
The Becker court recognized that, as in products liability, strict
liability provides a financial incentive to reduce the level of accidents
below that which would exist under other tort doctrines.60 Imposing
54. Id. at 477, 698 P.2d at 131, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
55. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 623-28, 517 P.2d at 1172-76, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 708-12. The
court stated the policy considerations in the creation of the warranty of habitability. The court
made reference to the problems that plague all consumers when the warranty of habitability
has been breached including inadequate opportunity to inspect the premises, inferior bargain-
ing power, and insufficient knowledge to conduct an informed inspection even when the oppor-
tunity is available. Id.
56. Id. at 627, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
57. 38 Cal. 3d at 454, 698 P.2d at 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 487 n.6, 698 P.2d at 139 n.6, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 236 n.6. But, as the partially
dissenting opinion in Becker suggests, landlords may ultimately frustrate the twin policy goals
underlying the application of strict premises liability because they may never bear the risk
through the absorption of increased insurance costs. The dissent states:
The majority never considers the economic effect of its holding. The only logical
result is that the price of rental housing will increase because of the increased
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accident costs on landlords who fall within the stream of commerce
creates an incentive for landlords to avoid accidents where the cost of
avoidance is less than the cost of potential accidents involving litiga-
tion costs and high awards to injured plaintiffs."' Thus, once land-
lords have been included within the stream of commerce, and once
landlords are thereby subject to strict liability, landlords will be
forced to evaluate the desirability of placing residential dwellings on
the commercial market. This evaluation will reduce the risk of fu-
ture accidents.
B. Patent/Disclosed Defect Existing on Premises at the Time of
Leasing
The Becker decision left open the question of whether a land-
lord could be held strictly liable for an obviously defective (disclosed)
condition which a tenant could encounter at the time a dwelling is
leased. 2 But, the court continued to draw upon the products liability
analogy by indicating through an immediate reference to Luque v.
McLean," that the application of strict liability in such a circum-
stance need not support the tenant's claim. 4
In the products liability context, the Luque court upheld its dis-
avowal of any latent-patent distinction in the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity at the time the product leaves the manufacturer's hands. 5 The
court cited the language in Greenman stating: "To establish the
manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he
was injured while using [the product] . . . as a result of a defect
. . .of which plaintiff was not aware."6  Consequently, California
appellate courts suggested that Greenman requires that only a latent
cost of insurance, assuming insurance can be obtained for this purpose. Even if
landlords can sue participants in the original line of manufacture and market-
ing, the litigation costs involved will likely also have an effect on the price of
rental housing. Arguably, instead of risk distribution, the majority's conclusion
will result in a general increased cost attributable to the risks involved without a
concurrent benefit. Someone will have to pay for the additional litigation today's
decision is likely to create.
Id. Tenants impliedly will absorb the additional costs.
61. Id.
62. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464 n.4, 698 P.2d at 122 n.4, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219 n.4. The
court states: "We do not determine whether strict liability would apply to a disclosed defect.
(See Luque v. McLean, (1972) 8 Cal. 3d 136, 141-146, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 501 P.2d 1163.)"
Id.
63. 8 Cal. 3d at 141-46, 501 P.2d at 448-53, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 1168-73.
64. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
65. 8 Cal. 3d at 141-46, 501 P.2d at 448-53, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 1168-73.
66. Id. at 141, 501 P.2d at 1167, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
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defective condition would permit recovery under strict products lia-
bility theory.6 7 But, the California Supreme Court in Luque ex-
amined the perplexing excerpt in Greenman and concluded that it
was not intended to include the essential elements of the products
liability case. Rather, the Luque court suggested that proof of the
latency of a defect is sufficient only to impose strict liability upon a
manufacturer.6 The court stated that "[n]owhere in that formula-
tion was it stated that the injured plaintiff has the burden of proving
he was not aware of the defect." 69
The Price v. Shell Oil Company decision,7 which heralded the
inception of strict premises liability, did not consider the latent-pat-
ent distinction to be vital. Strict liability in tort was extended to bail-
ors and lessors of personal property who are engaged in the business
of leasing, where a product defect exists at the time of such leasing.
"The paramount policy to be promoted . . . is the protection of oth-
erwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defect." 1 No substantial
difference exists between the seller of personal property and the les-
sor of such property. The court reiterated the Greenman language
that a plaintiff need only prove the defect causing injury resulted
from the article a manufacturer placed in the stream of commerce.7
The troubling language of Greenman, which requires that a plaintiff
prove the existence of a latent defect, was not identified as the for-
mulation of strict liability law. Although the defect was latent, the
plaintiff in Price did not have the burden of proving that he was
unaware of the defect. The court would presumably treat latent and
patent defects equally once the stream of commerce test was met.
The courts adopted the Greenman broad stream of commerce
test in the application of strict premises liability in virtually all cases
to not require proof that the plaintiff was unaware of the defect at
the time of leasing. For example, in Fakhoury v. Magner,7 the
67. See Bennett v. Int'l Shoe Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d 797, 798, 80 Cal. Rptr. 318, 319
(1969); Preston v. Up-Right, Inc., 243 Cal. App. 2d 636, 639, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679, 680 (1969).
68. 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443.
69. Id.; see also Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 629 (1971) (supervisor standing behind a pay-dozer was killed when the operator re-
versed the vehicle; the operator's vision was impaired by a blind spot created by a patently
defective condition of a large engine box placed behind the operator's seat). The court stated
that "even if the obviousness of the peril is conceded the modern approach does not preclude
liability solely because the danger is obvious." Id. at 473-74, 467 P.2d at 239-40, 85 Cal.
Rptr. at 639-40.
70. 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
71. Id. at 251, 466 P.2d at 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
72. Id.
73. 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
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lessee of a furnished apartment was injured when the couch supplied
by her landlord collapsed under her. The lessee sued under strict
liability theory. The court concluded that the landlord was strictly
liable as a commercial lessor of the defective furniture rather than as
a lessor of personal property. Strict liability in tort was extended to a
landlord who provided an apartment with furniture. The landlord in
Fakhoury was considered a vital link in the chain of commerce.74
The latent-patent distinction was not addressed.
The case of Golden v. Conway75 represents additional support
for the proposition that the latent-patent distinction of a defect ex-
isting in a dwelling at the time of leasing is not vital. The court
extended the doctrine of strict liability in the non-residential context
to a landlord who supplied and installed, through an independent
contractor, a defective wall heater in an unfurnished apartment. The
court relied upon Greenman in holding that a landlord should be
considered a "supplier of a commodity" (i.e. an apartment). 7,
Courts have not examined the situation where a tenant suffers
physical injury because of an obvious or disclosed peril in existence
on the premises at the time of leasing. However, a court is not likely
to preclude landlord liability solely because of the type of defect. The
California Supreme Court indicated in Becker that the products lia-
bility analogy must be drawn through consideration of the Luque's
court refusal to limit liability to cases involving latent defects. The
strict premises liability case law suggests the courts are already
predisposed to disavow the latent-patent distinction and will impose
liability upon landlords for pre-existing obvious defects.
The impact of the policy underlying the doctrine of strict prem-
ises liability would be severely reduced if recovery were to be lim-
ited. The purpose of the application of the doctrine in the landlord-
tenant context is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from
unfit dwellings are to be borne by the landlord who put the dwelling
on the market rather than by the powerless tenant. To hold other-
wise would force a tenant to accept an unfit dwelling while permit-
ting a callous landlord who has disclosed a defect at the time of leas-
ing to immunize himself from liability. Yet, such a conclusion does
not foreclose modification of strict premises liability in other
contexts.
Leased premises are theoretically distinct from products when
74. Id.
75. 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
76. Id.
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patent defects arise after leasing. Although strict premises liability is
established through analogies between premises and products, the
fact that strict liability is frequently applied in products liability
cases does not mandate the wholesale adoption of the doctrine in the
premises liability context. The Becker court cautioned that "the
landlord is not an insurer" of the tenant's safety and the landlord
must not be placed in such a position through the use of strict liabil-
ity.77 The court implicitly asserted that premises liability may be
treated differently than products liability by omitting any reference
to the analogy between the two areas. 8
Finally, in analogizing between strict products liability and
strict premises liability, the "unawareness of the defect" language in
the troubling Greenman case provides a defense for the landlord. As
the court in Luque stated "it declares in effect that a person urging
strict liability must not have assumed the risk of the defective prod-
uct. 17 9 The defense will consist of a landlord's proof that the tenant
voluntarily and unreasonably encountered a known danger. If the
tenant assumes the risk, with full appreciation of the danger of a
disclosed peril in the dwelling, then the landlord will be relieved of
liability.80
C. Latent Defects Arising After the Property Leases
Whether to impose strict liability for latent defects not known to
the landlord and not discoverable upon a reasonable inspection is
easily answered after the Becker decision. Manufacturers and, more
significantly, landlords have been held strictly liable for damage
caused by latent defects if the defect existed when the product left the
landlord's control.81 Retailers who did not create latent defects have
also been held strictly liable for such defects."' Accordingly, a land-
lord should be strictly liable for latent defects caused by a third party
(such as a subcontractor) when the landlord can obtain indemnifica-
tion from the third party.
Three familiar factors indicate that the landlord should not es-
cape strict liability simply because an undiscoverable defect which
caused injury arose after the tenant leased the premises. The twin
77. 38 Cal. 3d at 473, 698 P.2d at 129, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
78. d. at 464 n.4, 698 P.2d at 122 n.4, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219 n.4. See also supra notes
61-67 and accompanying text.
79. 8 Cal. 3d at 145, 501 P.2d at 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
80. See supra notes 40-61 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 43-62 and accompanying text.
82. 8 Cal. 3d at 144 n.8, 501 P.2d at 1169 n.8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 449 n.8.
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policy considerations of accident reduction and allocation of risk to
the group which is best able to bear the loss, are as relevant in this
context as in circumstances where an injury results from an undis-
coverable defect before the premises are leased.
Additionally, since the object of a lease is not the item leased
but the enjoyment of the lease item, a lessor's responsibility seems to
naturally extend to dwellings regardless of discoverability of the de-
fects. However, this approach is ineffective because Civil Code sec-
tions 1941 and 1942 require tenants to give landlords notice before
the tenants are permitted to recover for a defective condition.8 Te-
nants cannot possibly fulfill this requirement when latent undiscov-
erable defects are in existence, and the tenants may not recover
under this doctrine. Thus, the strict liability doctrine should be made
applicable in cases of undiscoverable defects arising after the prop-
erty leases.
D. Patent Defects Arising After the Premises Leases
The most difficult question which remains unanswered in the
residential dwelling context, is whether to permit recovery for dam-
ages caused by visible defects which result from ordinary wear and
tear after a tenant has taken possession of the premises. Strict liabil-
ity appears to place an onerous burden on the landlord in relation to
a tenant's possible irresponsibility. As commentators have noted:
"While courts and legislatures can grant all the access [onto the ten-
ant's premises] imaginable, the fact remains that the tenant will
spend a great deal more time on the premises than the landlord
could or should." 4 The landlord frequently is not in control of the
premises but periodically examines the premises for defects. If an
obvious defect arises after such inspection of the premises, it is inher-
ently unjust to permit an injured tenant to recover without consider-
ing both the tenant's role and when the defect arose.
No products liability precedent exists for barring recovery for
patent disclosed defects which have arisen after the lease. However,
as the Becker dissent indicates, the strict products liability rationale
will prevail only if the applicable standards are modified because
apartments are not products which are supposed to leave the manu-
facturers hands in a safe condition."5 The tenant does not expect that
83. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
84. Davis & DeLaTorre, A Fresh Look at Premises Liability as Affected by the War-
ranty of Habitability, 59 WASH. L. REV. 141, 179 (1984).
85. 38 Cal. 3d at 486-87, 698 P.2d at 138-39, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36.
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all will be perfect in his residential dwelling for all the years of his
occupancy. 8' The result is that the landlord will be strictly liable for
all the consequences of any deficiency without regard to the timing
or discoverability of the defect.87 In effect the landlord would become
an insurer of a tenant's safety in his dwelling.88 Yet, the Becker ma-
jority, and all other California cases concerning this issue have ex-
plicitly refused to assign this responsibility to the landlord without
limitation.89 The courts have also given little specific guidance as to
how to resolve questions concerning patent defects arising during the
lease period.
The problem in this area revolves around notice. As a general
rule, the strict liability doctrine discards notice requirements and
thereby permits recovery for undiscoverable defects which ultimately
render residential dwellings unfit for human habitation.90 However,
strict liability is too harsh to apply in the context of premises liabil-
ity without modification. The Legislature has indicated an implicit
unwillingness to hold the landlord strictly liable in all situations by
requiring a tenant to give notice where a patent defect arises on the
premises.9" The doctrine should not be invoked where a discoverable
defect arises on the premises after the tenant has taken possession
and the defect is obvious.
Some commentators have asserted that the notice requirement of
warranty theory should be rejected altogether because the lease is a
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 60-62, 377 P.2d at 899-900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at
699-700.
91. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1954 (Deering 1981). This section provides:
A landlord may enter the dwelling unit only in the following cases:
(a) In case of emergency.
(b) To make necessary or agreed repairs, decorations, alterations, or improve-
ments, supply necessary or agreed services, or exhibit the dwelling unit to per-
spective or actual purchasers, mortgagees, tenants, workmen, or contractors.
(c) When the tenant has abandoned or surrendered the premises.
(d) Pursuant to court order.
Except in cases of emergency or when the tenant has abandoned or surrendered
the premises, entry may not be made during other than normal business hours
unless the tenant consents at the time of entry. The landlord shall not abuse the
right of access or use it to harass the tenant. Except in cases of emergency, when
the tenant has abandoned or surrendered the premises, or if it is impracticable
to do so, the landlord shall give the tenant reasonable notice of his intent to
enter and enter only during normal business hours. Twenty-four hours shall be
presumed to be reasonable notice in absence of evidence to the contrary.
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conveyance of a contract and not a conveyance of land. The lease,
therefore, contains an implied duty to repair and an implied concur-
rent duty of the landlord to enter the premises for the purposes of
making periodic inspections.92 Accordingly, these commentators con-
clude that the tenant is not required to give a landlord notice of the
defective condition of the premises, while the landlord should be held
responsible for such conditions. This position is unrealistic, harsh,
and contrary to a significant line of authority in California.8
Other commentators have suggested that: "In all other circum-
stances (i.e. where a latent defect does not exist), the landlord should
be held liable only if he has received notice of the defect from the
tenant or if he knew or must have known of the defect due to infor-
mation acquired from some other source."' 4 Requiring the tenant to
assume some responsibility seems more equitable and reasonable
than requiring the landlord to make frequent intrusive inspections.
The landlord should not be liable for conditions known to the tenant
which are not communicated to the landlord. 5 Moreover, in Califor-
nia such a requirement would be impracticable. A landlord does not
have a right of inspection absent some notice that a problem exists.
The rights of a landlord to enter rented premises, set out in Califor-
nia Civil Code section 1954, do not provide a casual right of entry.'"
Any lease provision purporting to grant such a right is void because
the prescription of such an entry cannot be waived. Therefore, with-
out some sort of knowledge of facts which would induce a man of
ordinary prudence to suspect that a patent/disclosed defect exists, a
landlord cannot absolutely guarantee the premises.
Jurisdictions which apply the doctrine of strict premises liability
allow a means of escape from wholesale application of the doctrine if
patent defects arise after the premises leases. The Louisiana Legisla-
ture codified the doctrine by providing that: "The lessor guarantees
the lessee against all vices and defects of the thing, which may pre-
vent its being used even in case it should appear he knew nothing of
the existence of such vices and defects . . . and even if they have
arisen since.' 7 But, not every defect causing injury is actionable.
Article 2716 of the Louisiana Civil Code makes the lessee/tenant
responsible for repair of specifically enumerated defects that occur
92. Davis & DeLaTorre, supra note 84.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1954 (Deering 1985).
97. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (West 1952).
1986]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
during the continuance of the lease.9" The tenant is responsible for
repairs of defects which customarily result from his use of the prem-
ises because the landlord does not have a statutory right to continu-
ally enter the premises to repair defects which may potentially cause
physical injury.
The approach California courts implicitly take, and which they
should explicitly employ where patent/disclosed defects have arisen
after the tenant leases the premises, is evidenced in Evans v. Thoma-
son.99 In Evans, the tenants brought an action for personal injuries
and property damage arising out of an overloaded electrical cord fire.
One of the sockets of a kitchen double plug receptacle failed and the
tenants substituted a lightweight extension cord to power their
freezer and refrigerator. The landlords did not repair the plug and
the overloaded cord failed.
In affirming a judgment against the landlords, the court of ap-
peal summarized the facts which created the landlords' duty, and
concluded that the landlord was liable.' 00 In the negligence context,
the court states that "the landlords had notice of the condition" and
must be held liable.' Similarly, "notice" has been a constant con-
cern of courts applying strict liability in the landlord-tenant context.
In Uccello v. Laudenslayer,'0 2 the court of appeal held that a land-
lord has no duty to inspect the rental premises to discover a tenant's
dangerous animal. However, a landlord who has actual knowledge
of the dangerous animal and knows of his right to remove the
animal, has a duty to terminate the tenancy if the tenant does not
remove the dangerous animal from the premises.' 08 Presumably, if
the tenant has given the landlord notice of the defective condition,
the landlord is liable for the defective condition which arises on the
premises after the property is leased to third parties. Without such
notice the landlord cannot be held liable.
Moreover, in the criminal context, the court of appeal in
Kwaitkowsky v. Superior Trading Company'0 " held that a landlord
could be held liable for damages arising from the rape of a tenant,
notwithstanding prior identical or even similar events. The landlord
had ample notice of facts which should have induced him to take
98. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2716 (West 1952).
99. 72 Cal. App. 3d at 985, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
100. Id. at 985, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
101. Id.
102. 44 Cal. App. 3d 504, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1975).
103. Id. at 512, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 746.
104. 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1981).
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precautions against criminal attacks by third persons.1"5 As the court
stated: "The landlord ...had prior notice of a tenant who was
assaulted and robbed two months before Ms. Kwaitkowsky was as-
saulted, robbed and raped. The landlords had notice that their apart-
ment was in a high crime area and that the lock of the lobby en-
trance door was defective."' 06
Thus, the doctrine of strict liability has been applied, and
should apply, to limited factual situations. The above cases were
cited by the Becker court to extend the warranty of habitability into
strict premises liability, but are inconsistent with the interpretation
of Becker which permits an unbridled application of strict liability.
Yet, the Becker court affirmatively extended the warranty of habita-
bility into tort liability, and therefore other tort causes of action can
be asserted to permit a tenant redress, while concomitantly affording
the landlord a base level of protection.
IV. ALTERNATIVE TORT CAUSES OF ACTION
In addition to strict liability, a plaintiff may bring several tort
causes of action in some California courts based upon a breach of the
warranty of habitability or based upon the existence of dilapidated
conditions in a residential dwelling. Alternative paths for recovery
where a disclosed/patent defect has emerged after a tenant has
leased a dwelling, or where strict premises liability may not apply,
include an application of negligence doctrine, nuisance, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
A. Negligence and the Implied Warranty of Habitability
In applying the rationale of Rowland, courts have held that the
common law duty of care specified in Civil Code section 1714 should
be applicable in the premises liability context. 10 7 As Rowland sug-
gests, a departure from the fundamental principle of liability articu-
lated in Civil Code section 1714 "involves a balancing of a number
of considerations" including the foreseeability of harm and public
policy supporting its application.'0
105. Id. at 326, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
106. Id. at 328, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
107. See, e.g., Golden, 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976); Green, 10 Cal.
App. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
108. The Rowland court stated that the considerations which should be balanced are: 1)
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; 2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury; 3) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suf-
fered; 4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct; 5) the policy of preventing
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An application of the "reasonable foreseeability" principles in
the landlord-tenant context leads to the conclusion that landlords
should owe a duty of reasonable care to tenants who suffer injuries
on the premises. In a typical rental situation involving a residential
dwelling, the foreseeability of harm to a tenant from the landlord's
failure to maintain the premises in a habitable condition is apparent.
The degree of certainty that the tenant suffered injury and the close-
ness of the connection between the landlord's conduct and the injury
is readily ascertainable by proof in each case. Further, the moral
blame attached to the landlord's conduct does not comply with either
the habitability requirements articulated in the Civil Code, or the
policy of preventing future harm by imposing a duty of reasonable
care upon the landlord. Moreover, the imposition of a duty to exer-
cise care with the resulting liability for breach would not unduly
extend a landlord's burden because of the availability, cost and prev-
alence of insurance for the risk involved. Under the policy considera-
tions articulated in Rowland, a regard for human health and safety
compels the imposition on the landlord a duty of care in the mainte-
nance of the premises.
Accordingly, Civil Code section 1714, which embodies the gen-
eral reasonable foreseeability test of Rowland, has been, and should
be, utilized as the standard of care owed by a landlord. Additionally,
as Civil Code section 1941 and the housing codes of California were
designed to protect the health and safety of tenants, a rebuttable pre-
sumption of negligence on the part of the landlord should arise if the
tenant proves the landlord violated the statute and the violation
proximately caused the injury.' 0 9 This presumption is supported by
the fact that Civil Code section 1941 is intended to prevent the same
conditions that the general negligence statute in premises liability
cases would prevent, while evidence of a breach of the warranty of
habitability also supports a negligence cause of action. It would be a
ludicrous fiction to not permit the presumption of negligence where
Civil Code sections 1941 and 1942 have been violated, for in practi-
cality this is already occurring." 0 The presumption may be rebutted
by proof that the landlord did what might reasonably be expected of
a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances,
future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant; and 6) consequences to the community
of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and availability, cost,
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. See Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 113, 443 P.2d at
564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
109. See supra note 32-38 and accompanying text.
110. See Stoiber, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 903, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
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who desired to comply with the law.
This expansion of remedies provided by Civil Code sections
1941 and 1942 is justified because, as the court states in Green, "the
statutory framework has never been viewed as the curtailment of
growth of the common law in this field.""' Thus, both common law
and statute support a tenant's negligence action against his landlord
for failure to maintain the premises in a habitable condition. Yet,
under the negligence doctrine the tenant cannot recover where the
tenant has suffered unforeseeable harm, where the landlord has not
been negligent in his repairs, and where the tenant suffers no physi-
cal or economic damage. Alternative modes of recovery should be re-
sorted to in these different factual settings to facilitate tenant
recovery.
B. Nuisance
A cause of action for premises liability may also lie in nuisance.
Section 731 of the Civil Code specifically authorizes an action by any
person whose property is injuriously affected, or whose enjoyment of
property is lessened by a nuisance. 1 2 Civil Code section 3479 defines
a nuisance as "anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent
or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of prop-
erty, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or
property.""' Thus, given that the statutory definition of nuisance
appears broad enough to encompass almost any type of interference
with the enjoyment or use of land or property, a defective residential
dwelling leased out by a landlord should fall within the scope of the
nuisance doctrine." 4
Nuisance liability is not precluded by the existence of a contrac-
tual relationship between the tenant and landlord. As the California
Supreme Court pointed out in another context, "every person is
bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring the person or prop-
erty of another, or infringing upon any of his rights."' 15 This duty is
independent of the contract and attaches beyond its terms. Thus, te-
nants may treat the injury to their tenancy as a nuisance or a breach
111. 10 Cal. 3d at 630, 517 P.2d at 1177, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
112. Id..
113. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3479 (Deering 1985); See also PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 86
(4th ed. 1971). Prosser states: "there is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire
world than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance'. It has meant all things to all men and
has been applied indiscriminately to everything."
114. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 731 (Deering 1985).
115. See Stoiber, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 919, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
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of contract (or a breach of the warranty of habitability) at their elec-
tion. Moreover, a tenancy is a sufficient property interest to give the
tenant standing to bring an action based on nuisance. " 6
A nuisance may be an intentional or negligent tort. The most
common occurrence within the residential dwelling setting is the for-
mer. For example, in Stoiber the court indicated that a nuisance
cause of action would be upheld where there was knowledge of de-
fective conditions such as the presence of leaking sewage, deterio-
rated flooring, falling ceiling, leaking roof, broken windows, and
other unsafe and dangerous conditions. 117 Such conditions are sub-
stantial interferences with the use and enjoyment of the premises,
and tenants should be compensated for such losses.
C. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
The right to recover for emotional distress without physical in-
jury has been recognized in some California courts in situations in-
volving a landlord's extreme and outrageous conduct directed at his
tenant. In general, the modern rule is that there is liability for con-
duct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by society." 8 Behavior
may be considered outrageous if a landlord: 1) abuses his position
which gives him power to damage a tenant-plaintiff's interests; 2)
knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress;
or 3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with recognition that the acts
are likely to result in illness through mental distress. " 9
Where a landlord has breached the warranty of habitability,
and where the tenant has suffered no actual physical injury but has
suffered severe emotional discomfort, this cause of action will be ap-
plicable. 2 ' By definition, the landlord, who has been given notice of
a defective condition of the premises in these situations, intentionally
damages the interests when he refuses to respond to the tenant's cry
for help. Moreover, dilapidated conditions on residential premises
have been held to severely disturb a tenant's mental state; on this
basis a tenant should be allowed to recover. An adoption of this basis
for recovery will permit tenants who cannot recover under other the-
ories a means of recompense for their suffering, while not unduly
extending any basis of recovery to unfairly burden the landlord.
116. Jones v. Kelly, 208 Cal. 251, 280 P. 942 (1929).
117. 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194.
118. Id. at 921, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
119. Newby v. Alto Rivera Apartments, 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 297, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547,
552 (1976).
120. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Within certain limits a tenant should be permitted to recover in
tort from his landlord for the physical or mental injuries he may
sustain on the residential premises. A landlord is not an insurer of
tenant safety on the premises, and therefore strict liability should not
apply where a patent/disclosed defect has arisen on the premises and
the landlord has not been given notice of the condition. This proposi-
tion is supported by both common law and statutory principles. The
twin policy goals of accident reduction and the need to more equita-
bly spread the risk of loss has spurred the California courts to recog-
nize the strict premises liability cause of action in certain circum-
stances. The doctrine has been adopted statewide in cases where the
tenant does not have control over the premises or where an undiscov-
erable defective condition is present. In different factual settings,
such as where the tenant has suffered only emotional distress, alter-
native tort remedies should be made available to tenants, for the de-
gree of suffering in such circumstances is no less severe simply be-
cause it appears to be intangible.
Jacquetta M. Bardacos
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